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1. Introduction 
Ramon LulFs reputation among mathematicians and scientists has 
had less lustre than among students of language and literature. He does 
not feature in histories of Western mathematics. His obsessions with 
comparisons of objects in pairs and with the magnificent but impossible 
dream of the General Art led Donald Michie, an eminent computer 
scientist, to label Lull «one of the most inspired madmen who ever lived» 
(Gardner 1982, p. ix). Martin Gardner, the well-known mathematician 
and Scientific American columnist, wrote that Lulfs life was «much more 
fascinating than his eccentric logic» (Gardner 1982, p. xiv). We aim to 
show that, in a branch of applied mathematics which has been perma-
nently established only since 1951, Lull was inspired but not mad. He 
shared with Lewis Carroll (another of Gardner's favourite people) the 
unfortunate characteristic of being so far ahead of his time that nobody 
understood what he was talking about. His sole disciple was Nicolas of 
Cusa who transcribed the only known copy of Lulfs most important 
paper, and who made an original contribution of his own, just over a 
century after Lulfs death. 
1 The au tho r s acknowledge with grat i tude the suppor l of the Levcrhulme Trust Ibr IMcL ' s work on 
the history of social choice; William Riker for an initial lead on Nicolas Cusanus ; Alexandcr Mur ray for 
t ransla l ing C u s a n u s and reviewing IMcL ' s t ranslat ion of Lull 's Latin text; and Rober t Pring-Mill for revie-
wing JL ' s t ranslat ion of LulTs Ca ta l an text. 
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2. What is the theory of voting? 
The deductive theory of voting is a branch of applied mathematics 
which explores the properties of different voting systems. It shows that 
voting procedures are often not so simple as is generally assumed, and 
that the subject is full of quirks and paradoxes. Perhaps that is why it 
has appealed to quirky and paradoxical scholars like Lull and Carroll. 
It begins with majority rule. Majority rule between two candidates 
(or options) is a simple concept: it is intuitively obvious that it is «bet-
ter» to accept the majority's preference (or judgment) rather than the 
minority's, at least so long as those in the majority are no worse quali-
fied to form an opinion than those in the minority. Though this intuition 
was not mathematically formalised until 1952 (May 1952), it was perfectly 
obvious to the inventors of democracy, the Greeks of the 5th century BC. 
But if there are more than two candidates or options, what does 
majority rule mean? Greek democrats seem never to have faced this 
question. Votes in the Athenian Assembly were always on binary propo-
sitions (in other words, motions to take some course of action where the 
alternatives were just Yes and No). Elections to office, where the pro-
blem of multiple candidates would have come up, were rare because 
Greek democrats had a strong preference for choice by lot over choice 
by election: evidently they thought the former was more democratic. (See 
e.g. Rodewald 1975). The first known discussion of a problem of majo-
rity rule with more than two candidates comes in a letter of Pliny the 
Younger. c. 105 AD (Radice 1969, pp. 220-4; discussed by Farquharson 
1969, passim, and by Rikcr 1986, pp. 77-87). Pliny realised that in a vote 
among three courses of action, the outcome if a three-way vote was 
taken might differ from the outcome by conventional committee pro-
cedure, in which one option is paired against another and the survivor 
pitted against the third. He tried to manipulate proceedings by holding a 
threeway vote instead of two binary votes: but his manoeuvre was 
matched by his main opponent, so that the outcome was the same as it 
would have been without manipulation. This is the first known discus-
sion of what are now called «sincere» and «sophisticated» (or «strategic») 
voting. 
At this point we must break our chronological narrative in order to 
explain the later work on the paradoxes of majority rule which Lull and 
Cusanus partly anticipated. In 1770 J.-C. de Borda gave a paper to the 
Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris in which he pointed out that the 
«ordinary method of elections» was defective because it could fail to 
choose the true majority winner. The «ordinary method» was what is 
now called «plurality» or «first-past-the-post»; it was the method which 
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Pliny had manipulatively tried to introduce, and which is in use in public 
elections in Britain, the USA, and a number of other former British 
colonies. In a plurality election, each voter indicates only his/her first 
preference; the candidate with the largest number of first preferences is 
elected, whether or not that number is greater than half of the total votes 
cast. Borda pointed out that it was quite possible for a candidate whom 
more than half of the voters thought the worst to be elected under the 
plurality rule. By implication, his criterion for a good system was that it 
should select that candidate whom a majority of the voters preferred to 
each of the others. His recommended procedure was the now familiar 
rank-order count: each voter gives 1 point to his least-liked candidate, 2 
to the next least-liked, and so on up to n, where there are n candidates, 
to his favourite. In technical literature this procedure is called the «Bor-
da count» in honour of its (supposed) inventor. Borda's paper was pu-
blished in 1784. 
The following year, the Marquis de Condorcet published his enor-
mous Essai sur Vapplication de Vanalyse d la probabilite des decisions 
rendues d la pluralite des voi.x, the Old Testament of the theory of voting. 
Condorcet made two discoveries relevant to Borda: first, that Borda's 
procedure sometimes failed to select the majority winner; second, that 
the majority winner might not even exist. The first discovery was impor-
tant because the Condorcet criterion («Compare each candidate against 
each of the others. Select the one who wins a majority against every 
other») is the natural, and best, extension of the idea of majority rule to 
the case of more than two candidates. Borda had himself appealed to it 
without defining it. The latter alarming discovery is most easily shown in 
the simplest case (not the one Condorcet himself used). There are three 
voters, A, B, and C, and three candidates x, y, and z. A prefers x to y 
and y to z. B prefers y to z and z to x. C prefers z to x and x to y. If 
they vote on the candidates two at a time, this three-person society will 
prefer x to y by two votes to one, y to z by two votes to one - and z to 
x by two votes to one! Whichever candidate the society chooses, there 
exists another who would beat him/her by a simple majority vote. This 
situation is called, in a term introduced by C.L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) 
in 1876, a «cycle». Condorcefs solution to the problem of finding the 
majority candidate, should one exist, is as noted to conduct exhaustive 
pairwise comparison among all the candidates. For three candidates, this 
involves three comparisons; for four candidates, six; for nine candidates, 
36; for n candidates, {« (n - l)/2}. The winner is then the candidate who 
wins all his/her comparisons. Condorcefs successive solutions to thc 
cyclical case, as he wrestled with the problem for the rest of his life, are 
unclear and obscure, although it has been very recently argued (especially 
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by Young 1988) that Condorcet does have a coherent solution. Fortuna-
tely, exploration of this difficult issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Condorcefs work was forgotten by around 1820. His and Borda's 
discoveries were repeated from scratch by Dodgson, who was again 
utterly neglected. The New Testament was not written until the 1950s, in 
the form of Arrow (1951) and Black (1958). These works reinstated the 
theory of voting, as part now of an academic discipline called «social 
choice»; and pushed the problem of cycles to new depths of paradox and 
impossibility. (The best reviews, for readers who would like to learn 
more about social choice, are Black (1958) for Borda, Condorcet, and 
Dodgson, and Riker (1982) for the 20th-century rediscovery). In what 
follows we aim to show that Arrow and Black's inauguration of voting 
theory was not, as has been generally believed, the third, but the fourth. 
3. LulPs contribution 
By LulFs time, the problem of elections had resurfaced in the Church, 
and above all in monastic orders, which had to conduct their own elec-
tions independently of the hierarchy of the Church. The Rules of the 
Dominican Order, for instance, which were drafted early in the 13th 
century. contain elaborate directions for elections to abbacies and other 
higher posts in the Order (Galbraith 1925, esp. pp. 5, 33, 46, 64, 103. 
114, 226-36). The favourite phrase among churchmen was that elections 
should be decided by the maior vel [or et] sanior pars. But this formula 
was dccply unsatisfactory, as every defeated minority could, and usually 
did, immediately claim that it was the sanior pars, and disputed elections 
were legion. They culminated in the Great Schism in the papacy between 
1378 and 1417, when there were two and at one point three claimants to 
the papacy. Lull made the most constructive contribution to this debate, 
which was also one of the first systematic contributions to the deductive 
theory of voting. 
His theory of voting appears in two places that we have found: in 
Blanquerna (c. 1282-1287), and a short paper entitled De arte eleccionis 
(Honecker 1937a, pp. 308-9) written in 1299. 
Lulfs voting procedure is slipped in to Blanquerna at chapter 24, 
where as elsewhere in the novel the story-line is suspended for a piece of 
practical advice. The Abbess has died, and the nuns are deciding what to 
do. 
AU the sisters wanted to elect their abbess by their usual elec-
toral method, but Natana said that she had heard of a new electo-
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ral method, which consisted in art and figures; this art follows the 
conditions laid out in The Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise 
Men, which follows The Art of Finding Truth. «By this method», 
said Natana, «truth is found, and by this truth we will be able to 
find which of us is best and most suitable to be our abbess». 
All the sisters asked Natana to reveal the way in which, 
through art, they could find and elect the sister best suited to be 
abbess. This was Natana's reply: «I will briefly tell you about the 
principles of the art of election. This art is divided into two parts: 
the first part involves electing those who will elect the leader; the 
second part concerns the way in which they should elect the 
superior. So I will first tell you about the first part and then the 
second». 
Natana said: «There are twenty of us in this chapter who have 
the right to vote in the election of our leader. According to the 
art we must elect from these twenty sisters an odd number, which 
should be five or seven, because this number is more appropriate 
for an election than any other; and the number seven is more 
appropriate than the number five. All the sisters should first take 
an oath to tell the truth. Then the first sister should be asked in 
secret which of the nineteen are most suited to be among the 
seven who can elect the superior. Afterwards, the second sister 
should be asked, then the third, and so on, in order, until the last. 
And on each occasion the answer of each sister should be written 
down. In the end, let it be ascertained which of the sisters have 
won the most votes, and thosc who have the most votes will be 
the seven sisters to elect the abbess. 
»The second part of the election concerns how the seven elec-
tors elect their leader. Firstly, the seven electors should agree 
upon a certain number and upon certain names for election, as 
they best see fit. They should compare them with each other 
according to four conditions, namely: which of them best loves 
and knows God, which of them best loves and knows the virtues, 
which of them knows and hates most strongly the vices, and 
which is the most suitable person. 
»Each of the seven electors can choose one person to be in the 
total number of those from whom the superior will be elected and 
each elector shall herself be among that number. So that you can 
understand the art more clearly. let us suppose that the given 
number of people from which our superior is to be elected is nine. 
Thus, the seven should be divided into two groups: two in one 
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and five in the other. The five should decide which of the two 
should be elected, and write in secret the name of the one who 
has won more votes. Afterwards, the sister who has won more 
votes should be compared with another of the five; this other 
sister should replace the one who has been defeated by reason of 
fewer votes. The defeated sister should be put in the place of the 
sister who is compared with the first or the second. This procedu-
re should be repeated, in order, with all the others, and the eighth 
and ninth candidates, who are not among the electors, should be 
included in this number. Therefore, taking this number as an 
example, thirty-six compartments 2 will be produced in which the 
votes of each candidate will appear. The candidate to be elected 
should be the one with the most votes in the most compartments». 
When Natana had explained the art of election, one of the 
sisters asked her: «If it turns out that some candidates have as 
many votes as each other in the compartments, what procedure 
does the art recommend?» Natana replied: «The art recommends 
that these two or three or more should be judged according to art 
alone. It should be found out which of these best meets the four 
aforementioned conditions, for she will be the one who is worthy 
to be elected». 
All the sisters were very pleased with the art and the electoral 
system. They all said that if they followed this art there could be 
no error in the election. So they all established a rule according 
to which they would always carry out their elections according to 
the way explained by Natana, and they began to find out about 
the art and learn it. After a few days, they had an election accor-
ding to the art and discovered that Natana was to be abbess. 
Natana was elected abbess. She was very upset by being ho-
noured in this way. She blessed God for honouring her above all 
the other sisters. However, she thought that the sisters might have 
made a mistake in the art and wanted to see the thirty-six com-
partments in which the art was arranged, to see if they had made 
a mistake and that she should not, in fact, be abbess; in which 
case, they should elect the sister indicated by the working of the 
art. Natana and the other sisters who had not been among the 
seven electors checked the method which had been followed ac-
cording to the art in the election and confirmed that the art had 
been followed as was indicated. Then Natana began to think 
2 T h e Cata lan word is ' canibres ' . We assumc that Lull had in mind the sor t ol' t r iangular half-matrix 
he later d raws in De Arle Eleccionis. 
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deeply about how she would learn and be able to rule herself and 
the sisters, and every day she meditated as to how she could 
manage the convent in right ways (Blanquerna ch. 24). 
The theory of elections recurs in later chapters, as when Blanquerna 
is elected abbot «according to the manner of election whereby Natana 
had been elected abbess». Later still, he is proposed for a bishopric. He 
does not want it, because it would mean giving up the contemplative life. 
Most of the electors nevertheless vote for him on the advice of the 
retiring bishop, but his enemy the Archdeacon leads a faction who do 
not want him because he might forcibly turn them from secular to 
regular clergy. The Archdeacon «opposed the holding of an election 
according to the art». One takes place «without the art», but it leads to 
a dispute, the majority electing Blanquerna and the minority the Arch-
deacon. Both sides go to Rome, where the pope rules in favour of the 
reluctant Blanquerna. Thus people who oppose the correct art of elec-
tions come to a suitably sticky end (Blanquerna chs 24, 60, and 67). 
There are several striking features about Lulfs method. Firstly, it is 
a two-stage method. Like Condorcet and the American Federalists (Ma-
dison, Hamilton and Jay) five centuries later, Lull seems to wish to 
compromise between democracy and giving a more decisive voice to 
better qualified electors. This may represent Lulfs attempt to compromi-
se between the rival principles of maior pars and sanior pars. Secondly, 
the election is to be made on multiple (four) criteria. It is not clear from 
the text, but is at least possible, that Lull realised that multiple-criterion 
decision-making may lead to difficulties in aggregating from individual 
to social orderings (for which see e.g. Arrow and Raynaud 1986). Third 
and most important, it is a method of exhaustive pairwise comparisons. 
The 36 cambres («compartments» or «cells») represent the 36 combina-
tions of two candidates from nine — as it would now be written n(n - l)/2 
for n = 9. Lull was one of the first mathematicians in the West to 
explore the combinations and permutations of smaller numbers from 
greater ones. In particular, the principle of selecting pairs of people (or 
properties) from longer lists appears all over the place in the General 
Art. Gardner (1982, p. 18) truly remarks that «Lulfs mistake ... was to 
suppose that his combinatorial method had useful applications to subject 
matters where today we see clearly that it does not apply». However, the 
application to voting rules is perhaps Lulfs most fruitful use of the 
principle of pairwise combination. Unlike others it is an entirely appro-
priate application of the mathematics of combinations, not repeated until 
1785. 
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Lull advocates the choice, not of the Condorcet winner but of the 
candidate who wins most votes when all the pairwise comparisons are 
added together. That is the natural interpretation of the sentence trans-
lated above as «The candidate to be elected should be the one with the 
most votes in the most compartments». This is in fact a «Borda», not a 
«Condorcet» procedure. It is identical to the second method proposed by 
Borda in his paper of 1770. As both Borda and Black (1958, p. 158) 
showed, Borda's second method must always lead to the same result as 
his first, the rank-order count. It is exactly the same as running a Borda 
count with a score of 0 for bottom place, 1 for second-bottom, and so 
on up to (n - 1) for top. Thus Lulfs first procedure, like Borda's second, 
appears to be a «Condorcet» procedure, because it make comparisons 
for every pair of the candidates. But instead of simply selecting the 
candidate who wins all eight of her comparisons, it tots up the votes she 
gets in each comparison. This is actually a rank-order procedure.-1 
The electoral procedure in De Arte Eleccionis was devised, Lull tells 
us, at Paris on July 1, 1299. He begins with a triangular half-matrix 
showing the 36 pairwise comparisons of nine candidates labelled from 
«b» to «k» consecutively: 
bc cd de ef fg gh hi ik 
bd ce df eg fh gi hk 
be cf dg eh fi gk 
bf cg dh ei fk 
bg ch di ek 
bh ci dk 
bi ck 
bk 
3 Therc is ano thc r possible interprctat ion of thc phrasc «The cand ida te to be elccted should bc Ihe one 
with the most votes in the most compar tmen t s» . Lull may havc meant «the candidatc who wins the largest 
numbcr of her contes ts». This is the Condorce t winner if there is onc candida te who wins all eight. If there 
is a cycle. there may be three or more candida tes who each win seven and lose one. If there was any o ther 
evidence from the lext that Lull had this idea in mind. then he would not only have discovercd cycles 500 
years before Condorce t but also discovered what is now called the Copeland melhod 700 years beforc 
Copc land . But alas we belicvc that such an in terpreta t ion pu ts too much slrain on the text and we settlc for 
the obvious one. 
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The full text runs: 
The art of elections 
In the Holy Church, good elections are greatly needed to 
choose representatives, as the church is to be governed by them 
and they must fight her enemies -sinners, infidels, and schisma-
tics. These elected representatives cannot do this unless they are 
good men, well adapted to the service of their Mother, who is 
good and noble, namely the Holy Catholic Church. For thc 
Church suffers greatly from those who pretend to be her faithful 
sons, but who are in fact evil men who do harm to their Mother 
and usurp her possessions. 
Therefore we wish to propose a method of electing a represen-
tative in accordance with the Third Figure of the General System 
of Knowledge, such that by following the stages of this method 
the electors may publicly choose the better person and that, if 
they do not choose the best, it will be obvious to everyone in the 
chapter that they are choosing the worse candidate and perjuring 
themselves without any colour of an excuse. The method of elec-
tion is as follows. 
Let b stand for the first candidate to have entered the Church, 4 
c the second candidate and so on to k, so that the first person to 
have held church office is called b, the second c and so on. lf 
there are more than nine candidates in the church, the cells in the 
figure above are multiplied by adding /; if there are eleven, then 
m. If there are more candidates than letters in the alphabet. we 
use numbers, so that one brother is called candidate 1, another 2, 
and so on in the same way. 
First, let all voters take an oath that they will elect the better 
and more suitable candidate. Next, let the electors sit down, and 
let b and c stay standing at the side, near enough to hear what the 
electors say, and so that they themselves are visible to all. Then 
4 Latin «quae in ecclesia prius fuit rccepta». This could alternatively mean «the first person to have 
entcred thc church» i.e. the first to s tep into the building. in which casc «the lirsl pcrson lo have held church 
office» should ra ther bc t ranslated «the first person to cnter thc room». Thc dist inction betwcen thc two 
meanings has non-trivial consequences . T h e first pcrson to cnter a set of pairwise votcs is always al a 
d i sadvantagc . if voters vote «sincerely» in accordancc with thcir prefcrences. So if the in tcrprela t ion in our 
t ranslat ion is correct . Lu l f s proposal biases selection against thc most senior. If the in terpreta t ion in this note 
is correct . it biascs against the most punc tua l . or the most pushy. Unfor tunate ly wc canno t decidc from the 
Latin which is correct . 
30 I. MCLEAN & J. LONDON 
let d ask everyone who is sitting down which of b and c he prefers 
for abbot, prior, or bishop, and go on until he has asked them all. 
The votes of the several electors are then counted and if b has 
more than c let c sit down in his place and b remain standing; or 
vice versa. Then let d be set against b: let c stand up and ask 
everybody which of b and d he prefers as prelate, and if b has 
more votes, let d sit down. Let e go with b and let c or d or 
another ask each voter in the presence of all, which of b and e he 
prefers for master. Suppose e beats b, then let /' go to e or vice 
versa; if b is defeated, let c ask each which of e and / he prefers 
for master; and so on in order to k, so that with k the election 
comes to an end whether k wins or loses. Likewise if there are ten 
in the chapel, the last decision comes with / in order, as just 
explained. 
This method of election is most useful and safe, because it 
does not involve secret ballots and private pacts, which are more 
open to fraud than the above method. Those who choose openly 
are so placed as to be in disgrace with their colleagues if they 
choose badly. Those who elect in secret are not. 
This new method of election is also good in that it is more 
general than any other method can be, because for every candida-
te in the chapter a reckoning is made of each elector's wishes in 
one of the cells of the above figure, and so each elector is happier 
with the result. 
Similarly, by this method of election any person in the chapter 
might suggest that it would be a good and honourable thing if 
this method were to be used in electing prelates, and he would 
obtain friends in the church, bring about peace, and avoid animo-
sity, so that he might be chosen when the election came, and his 
colleagues would show mutual love, so that in an election one 
should stand for another and so the standing of the chapter would 
be raised through the charity, justice, prudence, and other virtues 
shown by the brethren towards each other. 
If an election of persons not present is to be made, it should 
be done by the aforesaid method. 
This method of election was devised in Paris in the year of the 
incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ 1299 on the first of July. 
Thanks be to God. 
This procedure, unlike that described in Blanquerna, is a Condorcet 
procedure. Its modern counterpart is the successive voting rule used in, 
for instance, the Norwegian parliament (Rasch 1987). It uses the matrix 
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notation previously thought to have been invented by C.L. Dodgson 
(«Lewis Carroll») nearly six centuries later (Dodgson 1876). Because the 
winning candidate must have beaten at least one other, it cannot select a 
Condorcet loser. Thus it is clearly better than the plurality rule used in 
British and American public elections, which, as Borda was the first to 
show explicitly, can select a person whom a majority of the voters rank 
last. Such an absolute majority loser is the worst kind of Condorcet 
loser. If a Condorcet winner exists, LulFs scheme will select him/her. 
However, it cannot detect the existence of cycles because not every com-
parison in the matrix is actually used in selecting the winner. 
4. Nicolas Cusanus 
Lull appears to have been too far ahead of his time to have made 
any impact. In his Vita coetana he complained that nobody understood 
him when he lectured in Paris because of his «Arabic way of speaking» 
(Bonner 1985, I, pp. 29, 38). But one person who read De Arte Eleccionis 
may have been the transcriber of the only known copy: Nicolas Cusanus. 
Cusanus studied first at Heidelberg, then at Padua, where he gained his 
doctorate in 1423, then at Cologne. Padua was one of the leading inte-
llectual centres of Europe, and Lull's mathematical, as well as his theo-
logical, works were on the curriculum there (Sigmund 1963, pp. 22-35). 
Cusanus was active in the conciliar movement of his time. The Council 
of Constance (1414-17) was convoked to try to end the papal schism; it 
succeeded in ousting all three of the current contenders for the title of 
pope, and electing one of its choice. Its voting procedures were conten-
tious, and included a weighted-voting scheme (voting by «nations») to 
ensure that the Italian electors did not carry the day by sheer force of 
numbers. (Most council members were bishops and Italy had the largest 
number of bishoprics). Thus questions of voting procedure were part of 
the political agenda of the day. 
Cusanus' main work of political theory, De Concordantia Catholica, 
was written while he was attending the Council of Basel (1431-4). It 
defends the rights of councils to elect popes; and it discusses voting 
procedures in chapters 36 and 37 of Book III. These chapters deal with 
the election of a Holy Roman Emperor rather than a pope. Cusanus first 
discusses the need to prevent «practicas absurdissimas et inhonestissimas» 
(«the most absurd and dishonest practices») and notes that because par-
ticular electors come from particular «towns and camps of the empire», 
«turpiter foedatae electiones per iniustas pactiones fieri dicuntur» («elec-
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tions could be said to be disgracefully rigged by unjust pacts»). He then 
describes his procedure. We quote chapter 37 in full. 
535 When the electors of the Holy Roman Empire wish to 
proceed to the election of a future emperor let themconvene on 
the day arranged. In all humility and with the utmost devotion to 
the things of God, let them strip themselves of all sin so that 
Christ should be as Lord in their midst, and the grace of the Holy 
Spirit whom they have invoked. 
After a devout entry to the proceedings let them establish the 
names of all those persons conceived as worthy, by dint of both 
external and internal qualities, to function in so majestic an offi-
ce. So that the election may be made with unrestricted liberty and 
secrecy, and free of all fear, let the electors then proceed as 
follows. After first swearing an oath on the Lord's altar to elect 
the person whom their free conscience shall duly judge best, the 
electors should get a notary to write, on slips of paper precisely 
equal in size, the names of the candidates. One name should go 
on one slip of paper, and after the name a clear digit - 1, 2, 3 and 
so on - until there is a slip for each of the persons whom their 
previous deliberations have agreed to be worthy of consideration. 
536 Let us now suppose that ten persons, found from throug-
hout Germany, have been thus deemed worthy, and that it is 
from among these that the most worthy is to be elected by com-
mon resolve. One, only, of these names is to be written on each 
slip. Under or beside the name a number is to be written (from 
one to ten). Ten slips, each with the name of one of the ten 
candidates, should then be given to each elector. When the elec-
tors have got their slips each of them should go off alone, secretly 
(with a secretary if he cannot read), and, putting all ten slips in 
front of him, read the name on each. 
537 Let the elector then ponder in his conscience, in God's 
name, which of all the candidates is least suitable. Let him make 
in ink a single stroke on the appropriate slip to indicate the 
number «one». Then let him consider who is the next-least worthy, 
and write with two simple strokes of the pen the number «two» 
[in Roman characters - translators]. So he should go on, through 
the others, until he comes to the candidate who is in his judgment 
the best. On his slip he will write the number ten —or whatever 
number corresponds to the total of candidates. 
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538 It is recommended that all electors write with the samc 
ink and with similar pens and similar strokes, long or short, as 
they shall agree. In this way no-one's writing will stand out as 
recognisable from the others', and the electors will thercfore be 
able to act with greater freedom, and general harmony be preser-
ved among them. 
539 When the marks have been thus made let each elector 
take his own bunch of slips in his hand and throw them, with his 
own hand, into an empty bag hung up in the midst of the elec-
tors. When all the slips are in the bag the priest who celebrated 
Mass should be summoned, and a teller with a writing-block on 
which the names of those to be elected —ten in the example— are 
written in the established order. Sitting in the middle of the elec-
tors the priest should then take the slips out of the bag one by 
one, in whatever order his hand may find them, and read out the 
name and the number written on it. Meanwhile the teller at his 
side should note down each number as it comes. When they are 
all recorded the teller must add up the numbers by each name, 
and thc candidate who has collected the highest total will bc 
emperor. 
540 By this method innumerable malpractices can be avoided 
and indeed no malpractice is possible. In fact no mcthod of elec-
tion can be conceived which is more holy. just. honcst, or free. 
For by this procedure no other outcome is possible, if the electors 
act according to conscience. than the choicc of that candidate 
adjudged best by the collective judgment of all present. Nor will 
any surer method be discovered for reaching so infallible a formu-
lation of collective decision. For this method takes account of all 
comparisons of candidate to candidate - in whatever groupings or 
combinations - that any elector can make (quoniam omnes compa-
rationes omnium personanun ei onmes mixturae et syllogismi per 
unumquemque ex electoribus factibiles in hoc modo includuntur). I 
have myself been unable to find a better method than this even 
after much effort; and you can safely take it that a more perfect 
method cannot be found. (Kallen 1964, pp. 448-50, translated by 
A. Murray). 
What is the relationship between Lulfs ideas and Cusanus"? We must 
first establish how much of Lulfs work Cusanus knew. De Arte Eleccio-
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nis was, and still is, in his library; he may have copied it out himself. He 
knew of the existence of Blanquema, as it appears on a Latin handlist of 
LulFs works in Cusanus" library; but he probably had not re.ad it (Ho-
necker 1937b. pp. 570-1). 
Thus the scheme of LulTs that Cusanus certainly knew was a «Con-
dorcet» scheme of public voting; and Cusanus proposed instead a «Bor-
da» scheme with secret voting. Was this simply because he failed to 
understand the merits of Lull's scheme? (cf. Kallen 1964, p. 448, fn. to 
ch. 37) We think not. Cusanus' own words quoted above, together with 
the high intellectual regard for Lull reflected by his collecting, and pro-
bably transcribing, De Arte Eleccionis, suggest that he considered Lulfs 
scheme and rejected it. Neither writer gives a mathematical or logical 
justification for his scheme: such justifications had to await Condorcet 
and Borda. But there are arguments in favour of both the Condorcet and 
the Borda principles,5 and the debate between them is open to this day. 
We infer that Cusanus rejected Lulfs scheme on principle and not out of 
misunderstanding. 
The issue between secret and open voting is also still open. Both 
writers wish to eliminate strategic voting, but they make opposite recom-
mendations. This is because they arc discussing different situations. Lull 
is concerned with the members of a cathedral or abbey chapter voting to 
select their own leader. In this case, the electors are all known to each 
other, and must continue to live together after the vote. Thus it is 
reasonable to demand open voting: a voter will then be constrained by 
his fellow-voters" knowledge of his preferences. In general, this is the 
argument for open voting in committees where the members must trust 
one another if business is to be done. Cusanus is concerned with a body 
of electors meeting once only and suspicious of one anothefs strategic 
voting intentions before the election starts. He had first-hand experience 
of this at the Council of Basel. and it was a well-remarked feature of the 
conciliar movement. In this case, increasing the amount of information 
about others 1 votes available to cach votcr increases the opportunities 
and incentives for strategic voting of a log-rolling kind. (Log-rolling is 
vote-trading: «You vote for my pet scheme, or candidate, and I will vote 
for yours».) It was presumably in part to prevent this that the Councils 
voted by nations. 
In conclusion. then. we find that Lull and Cusanus, both hitherto 
5 The Condoree l prineiple is. as a l ready nolcd . «Compare each candida tc against cach of thc o thers . 
Select the one who wins a majority against evcry o lher» . The Borda principle is «Sclecl thc cand ida tc w h o is 
on avcrage highesl on the voters ' hallot papers». If cach voter ranks the candidates in o rder of prefcrence. 
hoth the Borda winncr and the Condorcc t winner (if the lalter exists) can bc casily calculatcd. 
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unknown to historians of social choice, anticipated the work of Condor-
cet, Borda and Dodgson by over 500 years. Although neither gives full 
reasons for adopting his favourite scheme(s). both clearly understand 
some of the logical issues involved. Much remains tantalisingly unknown. 
Lull was deeply learned in Arab thought, and he no doubt got some of 
his mathematical ideas from this source. Should we Iook to the Arab 
world for the origins of social choice as well as of algebra? 
Iain McLean John London 
Professor of Politics Research Fellow 
University of Warwick Exeter College. Oxford 
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RESUM 
Les modernes teories matematiques de la votacio desenvolupades en 
la decada dels 50, es pensava que tenien tres predecessors: Borda i 
Condorcet al S. XVIII a Franca, i Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) al S. XIX a 
Anglaterra. Aquest article mostra que tenien dos predecessors: Ramon 
Llull, que en Blanquerna i YArs electionis va desenvolupar dues variants 
del sistema de Condorcet; i Nicolau de Cusa. la bibliotcca del qual 
contenia una copia de YArs electionis de Llull, i que en el seu De concor-
dantia catholica va desenvolupar una tccnica de Borda. La notacio ma-
tricial emprada en el projecte luHia (i tan freqiient en la seva Art), es 
pensava que havia estat aplicada a la teoria de la votacio per primera 
vegada per Dodgson uns sis segles mes tard. 
